In the two extended conversations I've had with Ben Eason since his company, Creative Loafing Inc., declared bankruptcy almost three months ago, he expressed many feelings—optimism his company could weather the storm, excitement for his much-ballyhooed "digital transformation," and an almost casual indifference to the prospect of losing control of the six papers that together make up the second biggest chain of alternative newsweeklies in the country.
But one thing he did not express in our discussions, nor has he in any public way to his own employees, is a sense of shame or even regret in presiding over the dismantling of local institutions. Nor has he acknowledged the human toll his decisions have exacted on his employees, who with every week, it seems, grow fewer in number. Consider just the past week: At the City Paper in Washington, D.C., two web designers were let go. In Tampa, seven employees were cut, including a staff writer, a music critic and a copy editor. (That paper's editor, David Warner, gets this week's Most Transparent Line of B.S. Award for blogging that the "restructured newsroom can maintain and even increase the excellence and creativity that our readers have come to expect in print and online." Smoke 'em if you got 'em.) And in Chicago, home of the once-great Reader, press critic Michael Miner reports that the paper laid off six more staffers, reducing its editorial ranks to just 17, compared to 38 when Eason bought the paper last year. Here in Atlanta, there has been no apparent move to replace fired editor Ken Edelstein. The paper's news staff now consists of exactly three people.
Last week, I read James Surowiecki's "Financial Page" column in the New Yorker.
As a little exercise, I substituted the name "Ben Eason" where Surowiecki mentions Sam Zell, who owns the
beleaguered Tribune Company, which I in turn replaced with the words
"Creative Loafing Inc." It worked out like this in the first paragraph:
"When
Creative Loafing Inc. announced that it was filing for bankruptcy, Ben
Eason said that its problems were the result of a 'perfect storm.' You
take readers and advertisers who were already migrating away from
print, and add a steep recession, and you've got serious trouble. What
Eason failed to mention was that his acquisition of the company had
buried it beneath such a heavy pile of debt that any storm would have
sunk it. But although Eason was making excuses for his own
mismanagement, the perfect storm is real enough, and it is threatening
to destroy newspapers as we know them."
This little gimmick
doesn't work out quite so neatly applied throughout the rest of
Surowiecki's column, and given Eason's fervent desire to be a major
player on the American media landscape, I hesitate to further validate
his sense of destiny by stacking him up too closely to Zell, who
oversees something like twenty thousand employees to Eason's two
hundred and sixty. Still, although the scales are different, the
comparison is, to a point, an apt one. Two years ago, Eason's chain of
four papers in Atlanta, Charlotte, Tampa and Sarasota may not have put
him in any list of Fortune 500, or even 5000, companies, but it was
making money. It wasn't until he borrowed $40 million to buy the alt
weeklies in Chicago and Washington, D.C., that the wheels began to come off.
In the lengthy re-organization plan he submitted to bankruptcy court earlier this month, Eason mentions that his management team members "generally have good relations with their current employees." I think it's fair to say that such a characterization is about as accurate as calling Bernie Madoff an upstanding citizen. To the extent he ever enjoyed any respect from his employees, Eason, over these past months, has managed to let what little remained leak away. It's at the point where employees of his six papers have taken to calling the U.S. Trustee assigned to the case, expressing their fervent wishes to her that someone—anyone—other than Eason be given control of the company. Who says the devil you know is better? Not Eason's employees.
"There's not a person I've spoken to who has any remaining faith in Ben," says one Atlanta staffer. "He can't settle on one thing. He's constantly shifting gears, changing course, deciding that the next thing is what's going to pull us through. But he has no observable grounding in the fundamentals of this business. He doesn't seem to really understand how CL got to be a valuable commodity in the first place. He talks blithely of completely changing business models from one month to the next. It's like saying Christianity isn't working, so I'm going to become a Jew. This is serious stuff and I don't get the sense that he really has a grasp of what he's doing. He's incompetent in the classic sense of what the word means. He has no competency in this business."
A staffer up in Washington was more measured, but no less generous, in their assessment. "We got an email from him saying we're not in the newspaper business, that we're in the business of meeting the needs of urban explorer. That's not what any of us are here for. We have a lot of good writers and editors and they didn't come here to meet the needs of urban explorers. They came here to tell stories and dig deep."
The staffer recalled another email Eason had sent, saying he wanted CLI to be one of "the most admired media companies in America." "He had stars in his eyes," the staffer told me. "But I don't know if he's ever won a serious admirer in this building. I would be very surprised if there was anyone here who's hoping he holds on to the company."
Speaking of layoffs, it's become clear that the hemorrhaging of talent at Eason's papers is a way of keeping revenue numbers at a certain level. On October 1, the company employed 259 full-time employees. By month's end, it was down to 241. By now, it's down to around 225. The layoffs have given ammunition to Atalaya (the company that is the main creditor in the bankruptcy case) that with each passing week he's in charge, Eason is doing irreparable harm to the company. But even despite sloughing off staffers, the paper's revenues continue to drop. The chain went into October with $859,336 in the bank, and into December with less than $600,000. (Management is taking one for the team, however; in October, the company spent $70,751 on travel and entertainment; in November, that amount dropped to $27,329.)
I spoke briefly last week with Erik Wemple, the editor of City Paper in D.C. Wemple says his editorial staff of about a dozen, down from about twice that in early 2007, is "white-knuckling it, for sure. We've adapted. The paper has downsized. My main job is to hold the line."